I. Introduction
In the literature on firm-level data, the term "gazelles" refers to rapidly-growing firms. Gazelles are of interest both because of their disproportionate contribution to employment and as an indicator of entrepreneurship. The idea of "gazelles" dates from the work of David Birch (Birch, Haggerty and Parsons 1993, 1994) . Birch classified firms into "mice," small firms that tended to stay small; "elephants," large firms that did not grow rapidly, and "gazelles," firms that did grow rapidly and which accounted for a large share of employment or revenue growth. Gazelles are not identical with SMEs, as they include both small firms becoming large and large firms which continue to grow rapidly. A better understanding of the characteristics of gazelles, and the environments in which they thrive or fail to thrive, could lead to new insights on the conditions under which entrepreneurship thrives or fails to thrive, a matter which ought to be of great concern to policymakers.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature on gazelles. First, we focus on gazelles in China and India, using two firm-level datasets available for this purpose. There is little known about the profile of rapidly-growing firms in developing countries. To our knowledge, the literature on gazelles has so far relied on examples drawn from OECD data, and the conclusions from that literature may not generalize. We provide profiles for the two largest developing economies and are able to contrast them to some degree, though differences in coverage in the datasets pose some challenges for comparison.
Second, we examine the relationship between gazelles and exporting. Are exporting firms more likely to be gazelles? Can you be a gazelle without exporting, and if so, how? This perspective complements the extensive literature on exporting and productivity. 2 Rapid growth and productivity are alternate methods of measuring firm success, which have different implications -for example, firms gaining in productivity may shed jobs, whereas rapidly growing firms are more likely to employ new workers. Moreover, measurement of firm growth, whether by revenue, employment, or some other metric, is arguably less sensitive to details of method than is productivity measurement, in particular the measurement of TFP.
Third, we introduce the concept of "gazillas," very large firms which also grow rapidly. That is, we add to the firm-level bestiary of "mice," "elephants" and "gazelles" a mythical animal, meant to denote a gazelle the size of Godzilla. Recent examples of gazillas include Apple in the United States, Gazprom in Russia, and Nintendo in Japan. While it has previously been noted that not all gazelles are small 3 , we believe that the largest rapidly-growing firms in an economy may be archetypal of a number of features in the economic environment, and that the stories of gazillas are particularly informative with respect to broad national differences in economic development, as well as yielding insights into large episodes of reform and structural change. Both the Chinese and Indian data disclose the names of individual firms, unlike in most OECD firm-level data where the names are protected by confidentiality. This allows us to identify the largest high-growth firms and develop narratives about them using open-source information.
Our principal findings are as follows: Gazelles exist in all sectors in both China and India. On the margin, exporters of goods are more likely to be gazelles in both China and India, but many non-exporters are gazelles, suggesting that there are substantial opportunities in selling to the domestic market. In both countries, state-owned enterprises are less likely on average to be gazelles and foreign-owned enterprises are more likely, but there are significant counterexamples. In India, firms affiliated with business groups such as Tata and Reliance are as likely to experience episodes of rapid growth as are foreign-owned enterprises. Prominent gazillas in China include both foreign-invested enterprises (e.g. Foxconn), which are export-intensive, and state-owned enterprises (e.g. units of Sinopec), which focus on the domestic market. In India, gazillas are featured in both software and in recently reformed service sectors, such as telecom, where they have been key to the explosive diffusion of mobile phones in the last 20 years.
The paper begins by briefly discussing gazelles and what is known about them in Section II. Section III briefly describes certain characteristics of the datasets used for China -the so-called "5 Million Renminbi" dataset of the National Bureau of Statistics, and India, the privately generated Prowess dataset of publicly traded enterprises. Section IV lays out the primary stylized facts about Indian and Chinese gazelles -their frequency, contribution to overall growth, profile with respect to age, size, and exporting status, and their sectoral and geographic distribution within Chinese provinces and Indian states and territories. Section V summarizes broad characteristics of the propensity to grow rapidly by means of probit regressions, focusing on ownership type -foreign-owned, state-owned, privately owned and variants. Section VI discusses the concept of "gazillas," identifying the principal examples of very large rapidly-growing firms in China and India and drawing out two of many possible narrativesone about telecommunications reform in India, and another about the role of state-owned enterprises in China. The final section concludes by discussing some of the many open research questions posed by what we have learned so far.
II.
Gazelles -what do we know already?
Gazelles are rapidly-growing firms, as measured by sales, employment, output, market share or some other metric. There is no standard definition of gazelles. Henrekson and Johansson (2010) , in a survey of studies done through 2009, look at some of the alternatives. Birch et al. (1995) define gazelles as establishments with at least 20% sales growth over an interval, starting from a base-year revenue of at least $100,000. This growth rate corresponds approximately to a doubling of revenues every four years. An alternative is to sort firms by growth rates and declare the top x% to be gazelles. This alternative does not allow for time variation in the percentage of gazelles. Other alternatives supplement growth rate with age (only young firms can be gazelles) or employment impact (an index number taking into account firm size and the absolute number of jobs created, as in Acs, Parsons, and Tracy (2008) . We define gazelles as firms that double their real sales during a four-year period.
The studies reviewed by Henrekson and Johansson (2010) all use data from OECD countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, or sub-regions thereof. A number of stylized facts appear frequently across studies:
 Gazelles generate a large share of net jobs, or sales, or whichever metric is being considered. This is of course in part an artifact of the way gazelles are defined. However, the skewness of the contribution to growth among firms is often striking; for example, Acs, Parsons and Tracy (2008) report that "high-impact firms," accounting for 2 to 3 percent of the total, account for almost all new jobs in the economy. This is particularly notable because the firms are not chosen for size, but include many small firms. More than one study finds that gazelles account for more than 100 percent of net job generation economy-wide. This is possible because net job creation among "mice" (small firms that stay small) and/or "elephants" (stagnating large firms) can be negative.
Earlier research by Birch (1979) found that small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) generated a disproportionate number of new jobs. This finding has been widely publicized, and frequently repeated in American political discourse. Most U.S. presidents have at some time or other declared that SMEs are especially good at generating jobs, and that the government ought to look out for their interests, either by active support or by getting out of their way depending on the political philosophy applied. However, any unique link between SMEs and job creation turns out to be fragile, as has frequently been pointed out (Brown et al. 1990 ), Davis et al. 1996 , Haltiwanger and Krizan 1999 , Neumark et al. 2011 , Haltiwanger et al. 2010 ). There are several reasons for the broken link. First, many SMEs stay small and do not generate a lot of jobs. Second, many SMEs exit the market, thus destroying jobs on net. This explains the redirection of the search for a link between "special firms" and job growth from SMEs to gazelles.
 Gazelles tend to be younger on average than other firms. The age of firms tends to be correlated with firm size; many SMEs are young or new firms, while larger firms are older almost of necessity, since it takes time to grow. Haltiwanger et al. (2010) demonstrate that for U.S. firms, there is no systematic relationship between firm size and growth once age is controlled for.
 Small firms are disproportiately represented among gazelles, but some of them are also large.
As noted earlier, both Birch et al. (1995) and Acs, Parsons and Tracy (2008) identify the presence of gazelles in the largest size class they consider -firms with 100+ employees and 500+ employees respectively. Our focus on "gazillas" is a further development of this feature of the data, facilitated by the fact that individual firm names are disclosed in both the Chinese and Indian data.
 Gazelles appear in all sectors, though they are more prevalent in some sectors than others.
For studies using OECD manufacturing data, there does not appear to be a marked trend for electronics or other stereotypically "high tech" sectors to contain a higher proportion of gazelles than other manufacturing sectors. For studies including firms from the entire economy, there may be a propensity for service firms to be over-represented in the population of gazelles relative to manufacturing firms.
A relatively less explored issue noted by Henrekson and Johannson is the question of whether rapid growth is "organic" or "acquired." Organic growth involves more sales and employment within the same firm or establishment, while acquired growth proceeds by mergers and acquisition. It is thought that organic growth may be is more likely to promote employment, while acquired growth may be more characteristic of mature industries and more likely to promote productivity. This issue arises in an indirect form in our study -some of our Indian firms are parts of larger "industrial groups," whose growth we do not measure directly. Some of our Chinese gazelles turn out on inspection to be pieces of larger enterprises, for example subsidiaries of Sinopec or PetroChina. Foreign-owned gazelles in India and China are of course pieces of larger companies headquartered in another country. In each case we measure the growth of the part rather than the whole.
III. Data
For our purposes, gazelles are defined as firms that double their real (deflated) sales during any fouryear window in the available data. Chinese firm level data was originally collected by the National Bureau of Statistics for their Annual Survey of Industrial Enterprises. The survey includes all corporate industrial enterprises with annual revenue of at least 5 million RMB from their principal business activity. A corporate industrial enterprise is defined as a firm that is established legally with its own name, possesses assets and assumes liabilities independently, and is financially independent. An enterprise is considered industrial if it engages in the extraction of natural resources, or processing, manufacturing, or repair of mineral and agricultural products. Thus enterprises that operate in most service sectors are excluded.
The Chinese and Indian data will be used for comparison throughout the paper, so a few key differences in the way they were created should be noted. The Indian dataset includes firms in all sectors, including various services, and the Chinese dataset is restricted to industrial sectors as defined above. For the purpose of analyzing the datasets, the revenues of the firms were converted using industry specific deflators to constant 2000 local currency. In order to compare the sizes of the firms, these revenues were converted to constant 2000 USD, using the contemporary exchange rate. All other analysis was done in constant 2000 local currency.
Figure 1 compares the distribution of the size of firms in terms of revenue for the Indian and Chinese data. 4 As seen , the Chinese dataset includes a higher proportion of smaller firms ($1-$5 million) than the Indian dataset. The Indian dataset still has some firms that are smaller ($1-$5 million), but also includes more medium sized firms ($10-$25 million). This difference in distribution is probably due to the way firms were selected to be in the datasets. The Chinese dataset has a cutoff on the low end, thereby it includes many small firms (Five million constant 2000 RMB is about 600,000 constant 2000 USD.). The Indian dataset, on the other hand, was selected from publically listed firms, which are probably larger and more established than the average firm in India, causing the dataset to have a greater proportion of medium sized firms. Over time, the distribution of firm sizes in China shifts slowly to the right, indicating growth of firms at all sizes, while the left tail of the distribution for India becomes substantially thicker over time, indicating that the firms added to Prowess over time are likely to be smaller than the ones added earlier.
IV. Stylized facts a. Prevalence of Gazelles Figure 2 illustrates the frequency of gazelles in the Chinese data, illustrating both how the frequency changes over time and comparing it to Chinese export data as a macroeconomic benchmark. In Figure  2a 5 We do not use the 2008 data because of completeness issues. An immediate question is whether this inverted-U pattern is an artifact of the construction of the dataset, or whether it reflects some underlying pattern such as acceleration and deceleration in growth of the Chinese manufacturing sector. In Figure 2a , we use growth rates in Chinese (nominal) merchandise exports as a rough proxy for the growth of manufacturing. Both the 5
Million RMB dataset and Chinese exports are dominated by manufacturing. These data show a similar pattern as the gazelle data, with the peak one year later (2002-2005 for trade) . This suggests that the time variation in the propensity of firms to "gazelle" is in large part macroeconomic, and that period dummies are thus appropriate when we do regressions. Figure 3 shows a similar pattern with respect to Indian gazelles. Broadly, these data show that gazelles are rare in the pre-reform period, but become much more common thereafter. The reform period is conventionally dated as beginning in July 1991, shortly after the onset of the government of Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. The first three four-year windows thus are at least partly influenced by the pre-reform period, and the share of gazelles in the Prowess dataset ranges from 2 to 5 percent. After the onset of reform, the propensity to gazelle accelerates sharply -21.1 percent of firms in the 1993-1996 window are gazelles. Gazelles become less common in the late 1990s, dropping to an 8.4 percent share in the 1996-1999 window. Thereafter, rapidly growing firms become more prominent, with the share steadily increasing to 27.6 percent in [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Since new firms enter the Prowess dataset at a rapid rate year-by-year, either because they are true entrants or because Prowess obtains financial data on them, the number of recorded gazelles increases even more dramatically, from 301 in 1996-199 to 1,661 in [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The figure also shows that the share of gazelles moves with GDP growth (the correlation coefficient of the two series is .85) and that the share of gazelles is more volatile than GDP growth (the coefficient of variation of the former is .55, while that of the latter is .27).
We have six windows in common for China and India, the ones spanning 1999-2002 to 2004-2007 . For that period of time, the average share of gazelles in the respective datasets is 15.3 percent for China and 16.9 percent for India. These percentages are fairly similar. The differences between the datasets should be borne in mind here -the data for India includes services while China mostly does not. The China data includes more small firms which may have a better chance of gazelling. More notable is that at the end of 2007 (and through 2008) the share of rapidly growing firms was rising in India but declining in China.
b. Contribution of Gazelles to overall growth
Next, we ask how skewed is the distribution of revenue growth for the firms in each of our samples. We know by definition that gazelles account for a disproportionate share of revenue growth, and that in the OECD studies a small firms can account for a very high share of revenue growth or employment growth. Figure 4 shows the impact of gazelles in the China sample. The left panel contrasts the real revenue growth in each window for gazelles and non-gazelles. To be a gazelle, one has only to have 100 percent revenue growth in a window, but in aggregate the group of gazelles in each window grows by 218 to 290 percent, that is, they triple or quadruple their revenue. The right panel shows the share of revenue growth in each window which is accounted for by non-gazelles. In general, 10 to 20 percent of the firms in the China sample account for 30 to 70 percent of the revenue growth, but this skewness varies substantially over time. is in tension with the deceleration in export growth shown above, suggesting that many of these firms are selling to the domestic market. We will explore this later.
In India, the difference in performance between gazelles and non-gazelles is much more striking, as illustrated in Figure 5 . Over the 17 available windows, the aggregate real revenue growth of gazelles fluctuates in a range from 178 percent to 251 percent. The big difference is the very sluggish performance of non-gazelles. For the windows from 1989-1992 through 1992-1995, which largely include the pre-reform period, aggregate real revenue growth of the firms in Prowess is negative. There is also negative growth in the windows 1995-1998 through 1997-2000 . That is, there are a small number of gazelles in the earlier periods, and though their performance is outstanding, they are not enough to create aggregate growth. Since aggregate sales growth in these periods is negative, the share of gazelles in total sales growth is undefined. c. Gazelling, Exporting Status, and Age
In China, exporters are more likely to be gazelles, but many gazelles are not exporters. The stylized facts are presented in Table 1 . The analysis for China is constrained to four of the six windows, because export data is missing for 2006 and 2007 . Over the period 2002 -2005 .9 percent of exporters have undergone an episode of rapid growth, as compared to 29.3 percent of the non-exporters. This is also true on a year-by-year basis, though the difference between exporters and non-exporters is generally only about three percentage points (e.g, 19.4 percent vs. 16.2 percent in 2002-2005) . So while exporting is associated with rapid growth on average, it is not necessary for rapid growth. In any given window, non-exporting gazelles outnumber exporting gazelles by 2 to 1 or more (e.g. in 2002-2005 there were 11,699 non-exporting gazelles and 6,137 exporting gazelles). This result is striking since most of the firms in the Chinese data produce merchandise that in principle could be exported (the data do not encompass service exports).
In India, non-exporting firms are more likely to be gazelles than exporting firms. Non-exporting firms are twice as likely to be gazelles as exporting firms (Table 2) . It is important to note that the Prowess dataset contains a lot of service firms, but a similar tabulation for manufacturing firms only (not shown) shows that there is no significant difference between exporting and non-exporting firms in their propensity to grow rapidly.
The OECD literature tells us that younger firms are more likely to grow rapidly. This also is true for China and India. We look at China and India differently (NB this is work-in-progress). For China, we consider the age of the firm at the time of the first year of the window. Since there are only six windows, age is a partial proxy for the historical time the firm was founded. For example, 10-year-old firms in our sample were founded in the period from 1989-1994, during China's "third generation" of Communist Party leadership following Tiananmen Square (check this). For India, where we have a longer time period, we sort out the firms according to the year they were founded, using broad time periods evocative of India's history. We begin by doing cross-tabulations of gazelle status, exporting status, and age. This will help to motivate the probit regressions presented later on the likelihood of being a gazelle. It also helps to illustrate the point that many firms grow rapidly without exporting, even though they produce an exportable good.
In this section, we categorize a firm as a gazelle if it has undergone one or more episodes of doubling firm growth in any period. Similarly, a firm is classified as an exporter if it has ever been observed exporting (check this). Firms may start and stop growing fast. The period of gazelling need not be the period of exporting. Table 3 shows the distribution of Chinese firms by age, exporting, and gazelle status. The median age of a firm in the Chinese dataset is about 8 years, and the median age for gazelles is about 6 years. The prevalence of gazelles is significantly higher for firms 25 years and younger. Among firms 10 years old or less, 17.7 percent have undergone at least one episode of gazelling, as opposed to about 6 percent for firms 26 years old or more. More than half of the gazelles do not export. As an illustration, in 2004-2007 there were 7,605 gazelles that exported and 18,035 gazelles that did not export, so that 70 percent of all rapidly-growing firms sell to the domestic market. This is striking since the firms are mostly goods-producing goods firms that could export in principle, and China is known as an export powerhouse. A further examination of Table 6 suggests that for firms of a similar age, gazelles are more likely to export than non-gazelles, but not by much.
In India, the association of newer firms with gazelling holds for the post-Independence period (Table 4) . 27.5 percent of the firms established during the license Raj era are gazelles, compared to 59.7 percent in the immediate post-liberalization era (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) and 63.8 percent in the globalized era. Notably, firms in the pre-Independence era are more likely to have been gazelles than firms established in the immediate post-Independence area. Since our data are from 1989 onward, this suggests that firms established under British rule were more likely to be successful in finding growth opportunities from reform than firms that were founded in the days of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi. As can be seen, the requirement of a clear exporting/non-exporting status shrinks the sample size dramatically. drop in the share of exporters reported most likely reflects an increase in the number of services firms.
d. Sectoral profile
To facilitate comparison of the China and India datasets on a sectoral basis we concord both of them to 2-digit ISIC, and then aggregate the sectors into bundles. This primarily involves concording the Chinese industry categories to ISIC since the Indian ones are already ISIC-based. We develop categories suitable for China, which is mostly manufacturing, and then apply the same categories to India, labeling the additional sectors available for India as "Services." Then we disaggregate services for India. Figure 5 shows the intensity of gazelles by broad industry and time period. The peak observed in the aggregate for [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] applies to all the sectors. There is significant variation across the sectors in the likelihood that any individual firm is a gazelle, which is fairly consistent across time periods. Electronics and related equipment (ISIC 30-32) is in first place, but not by as much as one would think given its prominence in exports. Measuring at the peak, where the dispersion is widest, the share of electronics firms which are gazelles is equal to that for vehicles, parts, and repair, at about 31 percent. The auto industry in China is mostly domestically oriented. The likelihood that firms in these sectors gazelle is almost twice that for chemicals, which is closely tied to the petrochemical industry in China, and much higher than for utilities and recycling.
In order to examine the relationship between gazelling and exporting further, we tabulate the propensity to export by 2-digit sector. Note that because data on exporting is unavailable for some years, we can only calculate this share for four of the six windows. We present the results of this tabulation by ISIC Rev. 3 in Table 5 . Using the share of gazelles that have ever been observed to export, we find that over 65 percent of gazelles export in furniture, apparel, telecom equipment, and computer and office equipment. At the other extreme, almost no gazelles in utilities (electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply) export, as is to be expected. However, only 20-25 percent of gazelles export in basic metals and non-metallic mineral products, only 15-20 percent in paper and publishing, only 11 percent in petroleum refining and coke, and only about 5 percent in coal and metal ores. Though we have not yet cross-tabulated these by ownership type, it is likely that the exporting and non-exporting gazelles split strongly, with the exporters being predominantly foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) and the nonexporters being state-owned enterprises (SOEs). It may also be the case that the exporting gazelles are more likely to be in the eastern coastal provinces while the non-exporting gazelles are more likely to be out west.
Such a pattern, if confirmed, is strongly suggestive of two paths to success in China -one for exportoriented FIEs and another for domestically-oriented SOEs. This may have further implications for political economy, and the tensions between market-oriented Westernizing tendencies and planningoriented tendencies which abound in Chinese politics.
Turning to India, we begin by looking at a sectoral distribution comparable to that for China (Figure 6) , with the addition of services as marked by the thick blue line. As in China, the overall share of gazelles in all sectors moves up and down together with macroeconomic conditions. Given the length of the time period, there is no permanent sorting among the manufacturing sectors, but rather a succession. Transport equipment firms flourish in the early 1990s immediately after reform, utilities firms around 2000, and extractive industries and electronics most recently. The secular trend of services to be more successful in gazelling than most of the manufacturing sectors is most notable, becoming pronounced after 2005. In 2005-2008, 40 percent of service firms in Prowess are gazelles, as compared to 12 percent in transport and 13 percent in chemicals. On top of the fact that service firms are more likely to be gazelles, a lot more of the firms in Prowess are service firms over time (Figure 7 ). With the share of service firms in Prowess growing from 15 percent to 33 percent over the observable period, and the likelihood of a service firm being a gazelle increasing from 16 percent to 40 percent, the overall share of services in the population of gazelles increases from 18 percent to 51 percent.
e. Geographic profile
In looking at geography, we classify firms as a gazelle according to whether they have ever undergone a period of doubling of real revenues in a four-year window. Since our time frame is longer for India than China, this gives us higher figures for India which are not necessarily indicative of greater entrepreneurship or dynamism. In Figure 8 , we show the intensity of gazelling in China, dividing the provinces into three groups -the top third in red, the next group in blue and the regions with the smallest share of gazelles in black. The question arises as to whether we can see evidence of China's "Going West" policy in the data on gazelles -are the shares of gazelling in the West catching up to those in the East? We address this on a preliminary basis in the following section.
Similarly, the geographic profile of gazelling in India is shown in Figure 9 . The top regions for gazelling are Haryana, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhattisigarh and Delhi. Some of the remoter regions have no firms which have ever been gazelles (Jammu and Kashmir, Nagaland) or even no firms in the Prowess dataset. Each of the most rapidly growing regions has a significant commercial center (Chandigarh in Haryana, shared with Punjab; Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh; Ahmedabad in Gujarat; and Raipur in Chhattisigarh). Notably, three of the top five states with the most gazelles also rank in the top five in economic freedom according to the Cato Institute (2011) . These deserve a caveat and an explanation. In China, the various structures of shareholding, joint ownership and so on are not always a guide as to ultimate control. The majority of shares in a share-holding corporation may belong to a state organization; a joint ownership company may be effectively controlled by foreigners; a collective (aka "township and village enterprise") may be in fact owned by a domestic Chinese owner as a "red hat" company in order to obtain access to local government; and so on. In India the category "private group" denotes firms that belong to a larger ownership group (known variously as "business group" and "industrial group"), such as Tata, Reliance, or Birla. Many private groups are family-based. Some older groups have evolved from the managing agencies of the British colonial period (Kling 1966) ; new groups are being formed on a regular basis.
The results for China are presented in Table 6 . Consistent with other literature on gazelles, younger and smaller firms are more likely to gazelle. More interestingly, we have found significant and positive results for both of our exporter variables, the lag of exporter, which indicates a firm exports the year before the gazelle period, and the exporter variable, which indicates a firm exports the first year of the gazelle period. These results imply that firms that are exporting are more likely to become a gazelle. In addition, this regression gives us insight into how the ownership of the firm impacts its ability to grow rapidly. Private and other domestic enterprises are those most likely to become gazelles, followed closely by foreign funded enterprises. State-owned enterprises, the excluded category in this regression, are those least likely to become gazelles. An important caveat to this conclusion is that these are the official registrations of these companies and do not necessarily reflect the equity stake of the different owners. For instance, some of the most famous state-run companies like Baosteel and SINOPEC are recorded as share-holding companies because a small portion of the company is publically traded. Therefore we cannot take these probit results as the final word on the successfulness of state owned companies in China.
The results for India, like those for China, confirm the results for age and size found in the literature on gazelles. Ceteris paribus, smaller firms and younger firms are more likely to grow fast. The negative association of exporting with gazelling observed earlier is found here when conditioning on other variables. (Table 7) This causes one to suspect the role of services in the sample. From an enterprise standpoint, both private foreign companies and private group companies are more likely to be associated with gazelling, with state-owned enterprises holding the last place as in China, about equal to Indian domestic private companies which are not part of a group. Table 8 presents the results for the subset of manufacturers only. There is still a negative association between exporting and gazelling, though the estimated effect is smaller than for the full sample. This suggests that manufacturers focusing on the Indian market in fact have had better growth opportunities than those who export. Among manufacturers, the effect of age becomes negligible (possibly because of pre-Independence firms who became gazelles in the recent period) and the advantage of private groups over other firms disappears, with private foreign firms standing alone in their superiority in terms of growth.
VI. Gazillas
One feature of both the China and India datasets is that it is possible to read the names of the firms. This feature is usually not shared by industrial censuses conducted by OECD governments, but is shared with business databases such as Dun and Bradstreet and Orbis. In our exploratory work, we noticed that Infosys, the Indian software giant, was on our list of gazelles, and that it had maintained rapid growth for a long period of time. This led us to wonder whether very large gazelles might be part of the Indian and Chinese scenes, and had not been identified before due to the use of business-confidential data.
In an informal attempt to look at the presence of "gazillas" globally, we employed a stock screener available at Fidelity.com. The stock screener enables the user to search a database of over 6,000 equities tradable through Fidelity by criteria -admittedly a selective sample, but a convenient one. We chose firms with $5 billion or more of revenues in the most recent year available (generally 2011) whose nominal revenues had doubled in a five-year period. This is not quite as stringent a filter as we have been using for India and China. The procedure identified about 70 firms in a variety of sectors, of which about half are in the United States. Among the more notable gazillas in the United States are Apple, CVS Caremark, Amazon, Google, Las Vegas Sand, and Community Health Systems in the United States. There was one in Japan (Nintendo), one in Russia (Gazprom) and nine in Brazil, in sectors including banking, chemicals, food products, utilities and retailing. The largest of the gazillas in this group was Petrochina, with revenues of $334 billion (over twice those of Apple) and a compounded annual growth of 29 percent (vs. 41 percent for Apple).
One can say "as American as Apple" (with or without the pie), "as Russian as Gazprom," "as Japanese as Nintendo." The idea arises that gazillas are the largest, most successful businesses in an economy, and may reveal a number of environmental features about the business, policy, and technological climate in a country, or what Alfred Marshall (1920) would have characterized as "the industrial leadership" of a nation included among the group of leaders. 7 If the largest animal in the Jurassic period was Brontosaurus, we can infer that the environment consisted of large swamps rich in plant material and suitable for bearing the weight of a large animal, and perhaps other things. We know a lot about the U.S. economy from an examination of Apple -people are wired, global fragmentation of production is important with the United States taking the lead in research (Linden et al. 2007) , consumers care about novelty and style, and so on. Should we be saying "As Chinese as Petrochina"? "As Indian as Infosys"? And if so, what would we mean by that? Table 9 lists some notable gazillas in China. Firms on the list were among the top 30 in revenue for at least four years, which do not need to be consecutive, and to have had at least two or more periods as a gazelle. This leaves a list of 17 companies. By far the largest Chinese gazilla is Hongfujin Precision Industrial (Wuhan) Co. Ltd., a Chinese subsidiary of Hon Hai Precision Industry, the company commonly known as Foxconn. Foxconn is an "original design manufacturer" headquartered in Taiwan, the final assembler for Apple as well as Acer, Cisco, Intel, Nokia, Samsung, Sony and other global electronic firms. It is striking that the greatest Chinese gazilla is in fact a business partner of the greatest American gazilla.
Other notable foreign-owned gazillas in Japan include Nokia and Dell in electronics. Lenovo, the computer company that grew by acquiring IBM's PC division, is Hong Kong-based. Gazilla joint ventures include Shanghai General Motors and Guangzhou Honda. Both Huawei and ZTE, the makers of telecom equipment, routers and other Internet backbone components are included
We present two looks at gazillas in India -the first is based on revenues using the same criterion as China, and yields 18 firms (Table 10 ). Of these, seven are state-owned enterprises, eight are members of private groups, and one is a private domestic firm (Gitanji Gems). Two are foreign-owned subsidiaries of Unilever -Hindustan Unilever (in cosmetics, soaps, toiletries and detergents), and Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. (in tea). The largest Indian gazilla, and also the largest company in Prowess, is Reliance Industries Ltd., the petroleum-refining subsidiary of Reliance Industries. Three are members of Tata Group. Four predate independence (Brooke Bond Lipton dates from 1912) but have had at least some period of flourishing under reform. Two were founded in the reform era -Bharti Airtel, India's leading cell phone provider, part of the newer Bharti Group, and Tata Consultancy, both established in 1995.
Our second look at Indian gazillas includes firms which have consistently shown rapid growth (Table 11 ). There are 22 firms which have had gazelle status for five or more of the 16 periods we observe. Most notable among these is Infosys, provider of business consulting, software and outsourcing services. Infosys has doubled real sales for an astonishing 14 out of our 16 observable periods, covering 20 years, and is now the 13 th largest firm in Prowess. Satyam and Wipro are other software services in the same space. The gazillas with sustained growth are dominated by private groups, which account for 17 of the 22 "most consistent" gazillas. Two of the "most consistent" gazillas were founded during the reform area, and one of these is also a cell phone company -Idea Cellular, which is part of the venerable Birla group.
a. A story of India -Mobile-phoning a subcontinent Long-time visitors to India remember when land lines were scarce, it was necessary to "book a call" for intercity communications, and the call did not always go through or went through after a long delay. In the last decade, cell phone access in India has leapfrogged landlines, with cell subscriptions going from almost nil in 1999 to 60 per 100 people in 2010 (Figure 11 ). We counted both firms and gazelles for the "telecom and post" industry in India. In the first window there is only one firm, the state monopoly. As reform starts more firms enter, but only a minority of them are gazelles, as if they are competing against headwinds. Entry continues throughout our period, and the probability of any given firm in the sector being a gazelle goes up steadily after about 1999 (compare Figure 7) .
We utilize the historical profile of Indian service reforms in Arnold, Javorcik, Lipscomb and Mattoo to overlay the development of telecom sector policy with the entry of firms into Prowess and the evolution of gazelles (Figure 12 ). 8 Broadly speaking, the public sector dominated Indian telecommunications prior to reform. The first private industrial networks emerge in industrial areas in the early 1990s, with private cell providers actually entering shortly afterwards, often with minority foreign equity. The introduction of the Second New Telecom Policy in 1998-99 leads to an increase in the number of firms enjoying rapid growth. By about 2002 the domestic long-distance cellular network was fully liberalized, with a remaining public monopoly on international gateways.
The two new gazillas we have identified in the cell phone sector have played a key role in the wireless connection of India. Both of them have adopted unique managerial strategies to cope with the combination of enormous pent-up demand and a rapidly changing regulatory environment. Bharti Airtel had 200 milion customers as of 2012. Its uniqueness consists in part of its extensive use of outsourcing, possibly being the first cell provider to outsource all of its core functions (physical network to Ericsson, Nokia Siemens and Huawei; business process functions to IBM), retaining marketing, sales, and finance as its core functions. The Airtel model also works in other difficult environments. Airtel operates in 20 countries, mostly in Africa, and is in 1 st or 2 nd place in 12 of these markets. The Bharti model of partnering with foreign firms to take advantage of market spaces opened up by reform and deregulation also operates in other sectors in India, including the Bharti Walmart partnership in retaling, and partnerships with Del Monte in food distribution and AXA in insurance.
Idea Cellular, founded the same year as Airtel (1995), was originally Birla Communications Ltd., having obtained licenses for Gujarat and Maharashtra. Since each bidder only received initial licenses for certain metropolitan areas, the problem for Idea, as well as its competitors, was to establish a national network. Idea's strategy for this was to form partnerships with both foreign firms and Indian rivals. Birla- Tata To give an idea of the size of the Chinese oil companies, SINOPEC Maoming is one of over 100 subsidiaries of SINOPEC, based in Guangdong and combining refining, power generation and port facilities. Petrochina is similarly structured, with subsidiaries of either qualifying as gazillas (SINOPEC focuses mainly on refining but also does extraction, and Petrochina focuses on extraction but also does refining).
The largest Chinese SOEs have emerged through a turbulent period of restructuring. Production in key sectors like oil, steel and electricity was originally done in ministerial units. In 1992, the 14 th Communist
Party Congress (CPC) announced the objective of creating a modern corporate system within socialism By 1993, corporations were given legal standing under the new corporate law. In 1997, the 15 th CPC established the shareholding system at the centerprise of enterprise restructuring (Jefferson and Singh 1999) .
The number of SOEs was reduced in a period of consolidation, allowing more successful SOEs to consolidate. Notably, Baosteel expanded by merger and consolidation with other SOEs in 1998 and 2008. SINOPEC has expanded more organically, mostly by importing vast quantities of oil and processing it. Both firms have also expanded by outward foreign investment -Baosteel has 8 foreign subsidiaries. Of the 321 million barrels of crude oil processed by SINOPEC in 2011, around 20 million came from overseas operations. Baosteel and Sinopec both exemplify the drive for growing large SOEs expressed by SASAC, the asset-supervision entity for large SOEs established by the State Council in 2003. SASAC policy has emphasized moving as many SOEs as possible into the Global Fortune 500 (Naughton 2012 , and was the third largest steel producer in the world.
VII. Conclusion
As Los Angeles was the city of a million stories in the television series Dragnet, so we have only scratched the surface of the narratives and lessons that could be drawn from the gazillas and gazelles of India and China. We have not discussed the conditions under which software developed in India, the rapid growth of the Chinese automotive industry, and the reasons for the apparent inward orientation of much successful manufacturing production in India and China -though the role of the state appears to be important in both cases. We have just begun to tease out the connections between age, exporting, size, and rapid growth in a statistical sense. We don't know why Indian private groups occupied so much of the space made available by reform, relative to domestic private companies.
Nonetheless, we think we have a few important lessons. Exports are a successful path to growth, but so are sales to a rapidly growing domestic market. Foreign-invested firms perform well in all kinds of environments. State-owned firms are les s likely to grow rapidly on average, but there are a lot of exceptions to the average.
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Percentage of Firms that are Gazelles by Exporting Ability
Exporter t-1 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** Exporter t 0.06*** 0.07*** Ln ( 
Robust standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Excluded Category is State-Owned Enterprise Table 7 : Probit Regression on whether the firm is a gazelle (India) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Exporter t-1 -0.36*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.18*** Exporter t -0.17*** -0.17*** ln(Starting Year Revenue) -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.13*** Age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** State-Owned Enterprise -0.14* -0. -0.22*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.12*** Exporter t -0.10*** -0.09*** ln(Starting Year Revenue) -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.16** revenue measure (product sales) the first year, is included for the revenue measure (total annual operating) for the end year. Even if the firm stagnated in the four year period, the addition of the revenue from other activities would make the firm seem more productive, which could possibly lead to it being mislabeled as a gazelle. Thus, the share of gazelles in the final period would be biased upwards. By comparing the "total annual operating revenue" and the "product sales revenue" that we have for the same year, 2006, we can get a sense of the magnitude of this bias.
The distribution of the ratio of "product sales revenue" to "total annual operating revenue" is such that they are virtually identical 9 in 83 percent of the cases, but for approximately 10% of the observations, total annual operating revenue is at least 10% larger. If the distribution of the ratio is similar in 2007, we expect that using "total annual operating revenue" would noticeably bias upward the revenue in a similar share of cases. In order to examine when this bias would make the difference between identifying a firm as a gazelle or not, we used the 2006 "total annual operating revenue" instead of the 2006 "product sales revenue" to identify which firms were gazelles. Instead of the 16.0% of firms that are gazelles that we found when using "product sales revenue," we identified 16.7% of firms as gazelles when we used "total annual operating revenue." This is a difference in estimates of percent of firms that are gazelles of 0.7%.
